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1. Introduction 
 
The Cournotian oligopolistic competition has mainly been studied in the case of 
production economies under partial equilibrium analysis (Friedman (1993), Vives 
(1999)). Nevertheless, the idea of Cournot oligopolists trying to take advantage of their 
market power has been developed in a general equilibrium framework by Gabszewicz 
and Vial (1972) in an economy with production, and pursued by Codognato and 
Gabszewicz (1991), (1993) in pure exchange economies. The behaviors of agents are 
asymmetric, as ‘significant’ agents are price manipulators while ‘small’ agents remain 
price takers. Other concepts of oligopoly general equilibria can be developed, based on 
alternative ways to introduce strategic behavior (Gabszewicz and Michel (1997))
1. In 
particular, an equilibrium concept for which all traders try to manipulate the price 
system may be defined, echoing the vision developed by Shapley and Shubik (1977).  
 
In this note, we consider a simple two-good pure exchange economy with a finite 
number of traders similar to this analyzed in Gabszewicz and Michel (1997). About 
endowments, the market sizes are and the market shares are the same in each sector, but 
the market concentration may be different or not between the two sectors. About 
preferences, we assume an identical Cobb-Douglas function for every individual, the 
parameter α  being an index of the preference of good 1 relatively to good 2. We thus 
define the oligopolistic behavior as effective when the equilibrium Cournotian supply is 
smaller than the competitive equilibrium one. In addition, we define the oligopolistic 
behavior as efficient when the supply reduction indeed leads to a more favorable price 
and beyond to increased payoffs. 
 
In this framework, we show that the Cournotian behavior is neither effective when 
the number of suppliers of the considered good is large (result 1), nor effective when the 
preferences are strongly unbalanced (result 2). The oligopolistic behavior is efficient 
only if the suppliers have over the other traders a net relative advantage. The latter is the 
result of the advantage based on the preferences and the one based on the numbers of 
traders (results 3 and 4). These results suggest that the strategic behavior may not hold 
when market power is equally distributed in economies with a finite number of traders. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
Let’s consider a pure exchange economy with two consumption goods (1 and 2) and 
m+n traders, indexed i,  n m i + = ,..., 1 . We assume the following Cobb-Douglas 
specification for the utility function of every trader:  
α α − =
1
2 1 i i i x x U   ,  1 0 < <α   , i ∀ .                                        (1) 
The structure of the initial endowments is assumed to be the same as in the case of 
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1 These authors capture a large variety of market structures through a general notion of non cooperative 
equilibrium for a quantity setting oligopoly in pure exchange economies.   2
It is assumed that good 2 is taken as the numéraire, so p  is the price of good 1 as 
expressed in units of good 2. Each trader i is an oligopolist who tries to manipulate the 
price by contracting his supply. We denote  1 i s  the pure strategy of agents  m i ,..., 1 = , 
with  [] m si / 1 , 0 1 ∈  and and  2 i s  the pure strategy of agents  m i ,..., 1 = , with  [] n si / 1 , 0 2 ∈ . 
The strategy set of each trader may be written: 
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A  symmetric oligopoly equilibrium is a  ) ( n m+ -tuple of strategies 
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The non-cooperative equilibrium is associated with the resolution of the 
simultaneous programs: 
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which give the following optimal strategies: 
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The individual allocations are: 
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The utility levels reached may be written:   3
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We now compute the competitive equilibrium. The individual plans come from a 
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where  1 i z  and  2 i z  respectively represent the competitive supply of good 1 by trader i, 
m i ,..., 1 = , and the competitive supply of good 2 by trader i,  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . From 
(14) and (15), we deduce the competitive plans: 
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The competitive equilibrium price 
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We deduce the competitive equilibrium allocations: 
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The utility levels reached by each type of agents are respectively: 
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Result 1. The symmetric oligopoly equilibrium coincides with the competitive 
equilibrium when the economy becomes large.  
 
Proof.  Immediate from (7), (8), (16) and (17):
∗
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This result explains as follows: the oligopolistic behavior tends to the competitive 
one when the sector becomes large. 
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Result 2. The oligopolistic behavior tends to the competitive one when the supplied 
good becomes strongly depreciated.  
 
Proof. Immediate from (7), (8), (16) and (17):
∗
→ = 1 1 0
~ lim i i z s
α ,  m i ,..., 1 = ∀  and 
∗
→ = 2 2 1
~ lim i i z s
α , 
n m m i + + = ∀ ,..., 1.   
 
When the good supplied by the traders of one sector is strongly depreciated, adopting 
a strategic behavior is no longer effective and is eventually equivalent to adopting a 
parametric behavior. As the traders of the other sector supply a strongly valued good, 
their strategic behavior is effective and their price manipulation works well (as long as 
their sector is not large):  n n p p / ) 1 ( ) / ~ ( lim
0 − =
∗
→ α  < 1 (but goes to 1 as n grows) and 
) 1 /( ) / ~ ( lim
1 − =
∗
→ m m p p
α  > 1 (but goes to 1 as m grows).   
 
Result 3. The oligopoly equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the competitive one 
when the relative advantages of the two types of traders offset each other. 
 
Proof.  The absence of a net relative advantage
2 on any side of the exchange might be 
translated by 
∗ = p p ~ . Then, we want to know whether or not 
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~
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implies 
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~
 for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1  (and conversely). The price equality 
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equivalent to  ) 1 /( )] 1 ( )].[ /( ) 1 [( 1 − − − − − = m m n n α α . So, we have 
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α . Define  ) 1 log( ) 1 log( ) ( x x x α α + − + ≡ Γ , where 
) 1 /( 1 − = m x , with  1 0 ≤ < x . We must verify that  0 ) ( < Γ x  when  ] 1 , 0 ] ∈ x . As 
0 ) 0 ( = Γ  and  0 )] 1 )( 1 /[( ) 1 ( ) ( '
2 < + + − = Γ x x x α α α , we have  0 ) ( < Γ x , ] 1 , 0 ] ∈ ∀x . The 
argument is similar for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1.   QED. 
 
Result 4. There is no Pareto domination between the oligopoly equilibrium and the 
competitive equilibrium when the relative advantages of the two types of traders do not 
offset each other. 
 
Proof. The absence of Pareto domination between the two equilibria means that 
∗ > i i U U
~
 for  m i ,..., 1 =  and 
∗ < i i U U
~
 for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1  (or  conversely).  Little 
algebra shows that these two inequalities require 
α α ) / 1 1 ( ) / 1 1 (
1 m m − < −
− . If  2 / 1 = α  
(absence of relative advantage due to preferences), this condition stands if  n m <  
(relative advantage due to the endowments in favor of the m first traders). If  n m = , this 
condition stands if  2 / 1 > α . The argument is similar for 
∗ < i i U U
~
 for  m i ,..., 1 =  and 
∗ > i i U U
~




                                                 
2 For instance, the first m agents detain a relative advantage based on preferences when  2 / 1 > α ; and 
they detain one based on the numbers of agents when  n m< . 
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It is well known that the oligopolistic behavior does not work when the number of 
traders is too large (result 1). Another condition of its effectiveness is the minimum 
preference valuation of the supplied good (result 2). We then put forward that when 
effective, this Cournotian behavior is efficient only if it is supported by a net relative 
advantage (results 3 and 4). 
 
The Pareto domination of the competitive equilibrium over the oligopolistic 
equilibrium (see result 3) suggests a further inquiry dedicated to the relevant field of 
perfect competition, which might not only concern economies where agents have no 
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